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Life After Derrida: Anacoluthia and the Agrammaticality of Following 
 
we could not not be haunted by the 
memory we still had of him. We could 
not not know that we were in some way 
being observed internally by him, by the 
spectral vigilance of his gaze, even if this 
quasi “presence” in no way limited our 
freedom. In truth, it even sharpened our 
responsibility.1 
 
Writing following the death of his friend Roland Barthes, Jacques Derrida 
delineates (only) three possibilities ‘in the time that relates us to texts and to their 
presumed, nameable, and authorized signatories’: the first is that the author is already 
dead when we begin to read him, or when that reading orders us to write about him; the 
second, that the author is living at that same moment, in which case we might know 
them or not know them, meet them or not meet them, and – in possibly coming to meet 
them – love them or not love them; the last, that we might read those we knew, met and 
loved at their death and after their death, that is to say, (immediately) following their 
death.2 This final possibility provokes Derrida’s deepest anxiety. For he has written 
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about authors long since dead, and – perhaps with most risk – about those remaining yet 
alive, but, he writes,  
 
what I thought impossible, indecent, and unjustifiable, what long ago and 
more or less secretly and resolutely I had promised myself never to do (out of 
concern for rigor or fidelity, if you will, and because it is in this case too 
serious), was to write following the death, not after, not long after the death 
by returning to it, but just following the death, upon or on the occasion of the 
death, at the commemorative gatherings and tributes, in the writings “in 
memory” of those who while living would have been my friends, still present 
enough that some “declaration,” indeed some analysis or “study,” would 
seem at that moment completely unbearable. (WM, 49-50) 
 
It is no doubt a tribute to Derrida’s immense personal capacity for friendship that he 
does not consider in this catalogue a fourth possibility – that of writing (immediately) 
following the death of an author we did not meet, did not know, and therefore who we 
could not, at least in person, have loved, yet whose texts and whose thoughts we have 
long been intimate with, have, indeed, long loved. How do we ‘negotiate’ – a word that, 
etymologically, evokes the disquiet or uneasiness inherent in such a procedure – this 
task?3 Is it not, perhaps, even more impossible, even more indecent, even more 
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unjustifiable – if not, in fact, plain improper – to presume to write, in some sense, ‘in 
memory’ of someone we did not know?   
 ‘Yet something I did wish to say.’4 
 It is in this predicament that I am, at this very moment, writing (immediately) 
following the death of the man, Jacques Derrida. His death does not signify for me in 
the way that it does for those who knew him, who loved him, who enjoyed the gift of 
his friendship. In the face of their grief, I feel presumptuous to think that I might mourn 
him. Yet, at the same time, I feel his loss. Not the loss of his person, for that I never 
knew, nor, strangely, the loss of his work, since there is so much I have still to read, 
since I know that Derrida’s thought will live on in his writing – ‘life [mine and his?] 
was going to continue (there was still so much to read)’ (WM, 37). I know that I will 
keep reading him, that I will continue to think through him, that his influence on my 
thought and those of others will not lessen due to the absence of the man behind the 
signature on a plethora of texts we have both read and have yet to read: ‘Jacques 
Derrida’. But despite knowing all this, I feel bereft.  
It is the desire to formulate my sense of loss in terms other than those of 
mourning – a desire driven by my equally strong sense of impropriety to be feeling such 
loss at all – that has led me back, on the event of Derrida’s death, to the only text I ever 
heard him speak, to the one time I met, albeit briefly, Jacques Derrida, the man: ‘Life 
After Theory’, Loughborough University, Saturday 10th November, 2001. (I remember 
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having the uncanny sensation whilst listening to Derrida that day, whilst watching him 
smoke my friend’s liquorice cigarette in the evening, that I was listening to the dead, 
watching the actions of a ghost. This man had only ever figured for me as the powerful 
and awesome mind behind the many texts on which I fed. His physical and human 
presence seemed only a momentary apparition until he returned again to the pages in 
which I was most familiar with him. Even more, I knew that this would be the only time 
he would appear before me. I knew that, when I left Loughborough, he would 
disappear, and that before I had the opportunity to see him again Derrida would die. I 
listened to him so carefully that day, I watched him so closely, because I knew that 
from, even in, that moment, and then for the rest of my life, he would always be dead.)  
At Loughborough, Derrida presented the paper published in Without Alibi 
(2002) as ‘“Le Parjure,” Perhaps: Storytelling and Lying’. Even as I was listening to 
him speak, I knew that I would return to this text – it placed its urgent demand on me to 
be read, and to be written upon. I did not know when I would respond to that demand – 
that time is now. What particularly caught my attention in Derrida’s paper was the 
anacoluthon, a substantivised figure derived from the grammatical term anacoluthia: 
literally, a want of grammatical sequence; the passing from one construction to another 
before the former is completed. Derrida himself had been drawn to this figure by its 
significance in his friend J. Hillis Miller’s recent work on the relationship between 
narrative and perjury, between, as Derrida’s title repeats, storytelling and lying. In ‘“Le 
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Parjure,” Perhaps’, Derrida is concerned to investigate further the ‘indissolubly ethico-
literary question of testimonial narration and of fiction’ (WA, 170). He does so through 
a reading - informed by the connotations of the anacoluthon - of Henri Thomas’ novel 
Le Parjure (1964). Although ‘“Le Parjure,” Perhaps’ is inspired by Hillis Miller’s 
writing and thought, Derrida wishes to 
 
withdraw this text from the law of the genre “text in homage,” even if 
sincere, and from the well-known academic scene: a long-time colleague 
and friend devotes an essay to a friend and eminent colleague, to an 
influential and distinguished professor whose work - one of the richest and 
most impressive that he has been given to know and respect in the course of 
his life - he wishes, along with others, to salute. (WA, 164) 
 
In place of such a text, Derrida instead performs that tribute by giving to Hillis Miller 
 
to read and to judge, the most demanding interpretation possible, but the 
most trembling as well, of a certain “story” or “history,” and to do this while 
taking inspiration from the lesson that, like so many others, I have learned 
from him. (WA, 165) 
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In order to remember Hillis Miller - and, in doing so, to pay tribute to him in the most 
ethical way he can - Derrida does not write about him but for him. In ‘“Le Parjure,” 
Perhaps’, Derrida is indeed, to some extent, writing on Hillis Miller, but not in the 
sense of providing an exegesis. Rather, his text inhabits the same textual space as Hillis 
Miller’s work, just as the overlying text in a palimpsest shares the same vellum as the 
underlying text and is inhabited and haunted by it. As Derrida perceives (in the passage 
I have placed as epigraph to this paper), this haunting presence of the other in one’s own 
work is both the demand for, and the mark of, one’s responsibility to them.  
Writing for a conference ‘in memory of the thought of Jacques Derrida’, I am 
struck by the tautological excess of this phrase. ‘In memory of Jacques Derrida’; ‘in the 
thought of Jacques Derrida’: these two phrases are synonymous, since the most ethical 
response I am capable of making to Derrida’s death, the most appropriate way in which 
I can remember him, is to offer to him - even though he is no longer here to receive it - 
the most demanding reading, writing and thought I am capable of, ‘taking inspiration 
from the lesson that, like so many others I have learned from him’ (WA, 165). In ‘“Le 
Parjure,” Perhaps’, Derrida prefaces the reading of the novel that he offers to Hillis 
Miller with three ‘reminders’, in all of which it is 
 
a matter of figuring out what “to remember” means - and thinking of 
remembering: not forgetting to remember, not forgetting to keep memory, 
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but also thinking of remembering, which also means in its French syntax: to 
think because, insofar as, as long as, insomuch as one remembers, thought 
as memory and first of all as memory of self, memory of the other in the 
self. (WA, 166) 
 
Derrida recognises an inseparable conjunction between memory and thought, whereby 
thought is memory; whereby one thinks insofar as one remembers, and, conversely, one 
remembers insofar as one thinks, of oneself, and ‘of the other in the self’. This 
conjunction finds itself expressed in the English verb ‘to remind’ - to re-mind - which 
signals ‘already a mnemotechnics at the heart of and not outside the thinking of 
thought’ (WA, 166). In this essay I do not respond to Derrida’s death in mourning, nor 
in thinking about mourning, but in the memory of thought. 
 
 
Following: The Anacoluthon in Derrida’s ‘“Le Parjure,” Perhaps’ 
 
In the first of his three ‘reminders’, Derrida comments briefly on Hillis Miller’s 
recent interest in the relationship between literary fiction and ‘the great and 
inexhaustible history of the lie, that is, of perjury’ (WA, 166). In this context, Hillis 
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Miller is particularly interested in, ‘“the implicit multiplicity of the authorizing source 
of the story”’5, since, as Derrida explains, 
 
as soon as there is more than one voice in a voice, the trace of perjury begins 
to get lost or to lead us astray. This dispersion threatens even the identity, 
the status, the validity of the concept - in particular the concept of perjury, 
but also and equally the word and the concept “I”. (WA, 166) 
 
Hillis Miller ‘gives several names to this multiplicity of voices or “consciousnesses”’ 
(WA, 166), either ‘signing or forging a new term (for example, “polylogology,” or even 
“alogism”), or borrowing it and granting it a new destiny, another working out, as, for 
example, following Friedrich Schlegel, “permanent parabasis of irony”’ (WA, 166). But 
Derrida wishes  
 
to insist on the most striking and no doubt the most productive of these 
figures, the one that assures a powerful general formalization even as it 
remains rooted and forever inscribed in the fictional singularity of a corpus 
that already produces it in itself, like a sort of general theorem, like a 
generalizable fiction, if I can put it that way, like a fiction having the value 
of theoretical truth and an ethical dimension: it is that of anacoluthon. 
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Doubtless more than a figure of rhetoric, despite appearances, it signals in 
any case toward the beyond of rhetoric within rhetoric. Beyond grammar 
within grammar. (WA, 166-7) 
 
Derrida’s admiration for Hillis Miller is directed here towards the ‘necessity and 
elegance’ of the procedure of his reading, writing and thought, whereby it is in the text 
upon which he is writing - in this instance, Marcel Proust’s À la recherché du temps 
perdu - that Hillis Miller ‘finds what he invents: namely, a noun and a concept that he 
will then put to work in a productive, demonstrative, generalizable fashion - well 
beyond this unique literary root, well beyond this oeuvre’ (WA, 167). 
Citing Hillis Miller, Derrida traces his concern with  
 
“storytelling (in the double sense of lying and of narration), with memory as a 
precarious support of narrative continuity, and with anacoluthon’s function in 
both storytelling and lying. Anacoluthon doubles the story line and so makes 
the story probably a lie.” (WA, 167)  
 
These concerns provide the matrix for Derrida’s reading of Thomas’ novel in the rest of 
the essay. It is not my purpose here to provide a summary of this reading. Rather, I wish 
to draw attention to the fact that in ‘“Le Parjure,” Perhaps’, Derrida performs the same 
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process of reading, writing and thinking that he so admires in Hillis Miller’s work. 
Derrida finds the figure of the anacoluthon in Hillis Miller’s essay, just as Hillis Miller 
has found it in Proust. (Interestingly, Hillis Miller’s attention was drawn to the passage 
in Proust by a footnote on the anacoluthon in Paul De Man’s Allegories of Reading 
(1979) and, in a further twist, Paul De Man, perhaps, provides the real life model for the 
character of Stéphane in Le Parjure.) Like Hillis Miller, Derrida then proceeds to invent 
this concept, to put it to work ‘in a productive, demonstrative, generalizable fashion - 
well beyond’ (WA, 167) its root in Hillis Miller’s text. He does so, in particular, with 
regard to the discontinuity of the self testified to by the anacoluthon and its relation to 
the structure of the oath, the promise and the Law.  
 In their discussions, both Hillis Miller and Derrida, quote the passage in Proust’s 
À la recherché du temps perdu in which the narrator describes Albertine’s use of 
anacolutha, and the effect they have: 
 
To tell the truth, I knew nothing that Albertine had done since I had come to 
know her, or even before. But in her conversation (she might, had I 
mentioned it to her, have replied that I had misunderstood her) there were 
certain contradictions, certain embellishments which seemed to me as 
decisive as catching her red-handed [qui me semblaient aussi décisives qu’un 
flagrant délit], but less usable against Albertine who, often caught out like a 
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child, had invariably, by dint of sudden, strategic changes of front, stultified 
my cruel attacks and retrieved the situation. Cruel, most of all, to myself. She 
employed, not by way of stylistic refinement, but in order to correct her 
imprudences, abrupt breaches of syntax not unlike the figure which the 
grammarians call anacoluthon or some such names [de ces brusques sautes de 
syntaxe resemblant un peu à ce que les grammairiens appellant anacoluthe 
ou je ne sais comment.] Having allowed herself, while discussing women, to 
say: “I remember, the other day, I…,” she would suddenly, after a semi-
quaver rest, change the “I” to “she”: it was something that she had witnessed 
as an innocent spectator, not a thing that she herself had done. It was not she 
who was the subject of the action [Ce n’était pas elle qui était le sujet de 
l’action]. (WA, 168) 
 
Albertine’s ‘abrupt breaches of syntax’ consist in anacoluthic moments of hesitation, 
and subsequent pronominal shift from ‘I’ to ‘she’. Used in order to avoid the disclosure 
of her infidelity to her lover, Albertine’s anacolutha reveal an intimacy between the 
anacoluthon and the way in which the very idea of fidelity is dependent upon a denial of 
– and, at the same time, is always potentially compromised by – the discontinuity of the 
self which Albertine’s pronominal shifts exploit. Albertine’s anacolutha enable Derrida 
to delineate the idea that all those ultimate signifiers of fidelity – such as, the oath, the 
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promise, and, the Law – are, in essence, vows to refuse or resist the psycho-
phenomenological truth that we are never the same at any one moment: 
 
This law, and no doubt it is the Law itself, the origin of the Law, is destined 
to annul precisely temporal difference. The essential destination, the 
structural signification of the oath or the given word, is to commit oneself not 
to be affected by time, to remain the same at moment B, whatever may 
happen, as the one who swears previously, at moment A. This sublating 
negation of time is the very essence of fidelity, of the oath, and of sworn 
faith. The essence or the truth of the Law. But the perjurer, the one who 
perjurers himself or herself, can always seek to be excused, if not forgiven, 
by alleging, on the contrary, the unsublatable thickness of time and of what it 
transforms, the multiplicity of times, instants, their essential discontinuity, the 
merciless interruption that time inscribes in “me” as it does everywhere. That 
is the ultimate resource, or even the fatality, of the anacoluthon. (WA, 173) 
 
The anacoluthon determines the (im)possibility of the promise: whatever other form it 
might take, the promise is always, in essence – and therein lies its gravity – a vow to 
defy the temporal change, rupture and discontinuity the anacoluthon represents; yet, at 
the same time, that anacoluthic discontinuity itself provides the grounds for the 
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disavowal of any promise, since one can always claim one’s non-identity with the 
promiser one once was: ‘“I sincerely promised in the past, but time has passed, 
precisely, passed or surpassed, and the one who promised, long ago or in the past, can 
remain faithful to his promise, but it is no longer me, I am no longer the same me, I am 
another, I is another”’ (WA, 173-4). 
 Albertine’s anacoluthic dissolution of identity suggests the femininity of 
Derrida’s idea of fidelity – a following that is also a not following – which is key to his 
concept of inheritance. The anacoluthic is that Other which is integral to, but disavowed 
by, the masculine ideal of fidelity upon which the Law, the oath, the proper name and 
the traditional patriarchal lineage depends. As such, there is undoubtedly a connection, 
as Nicholas Royle noted in discussion with Derrida at Loughborough, between the 
anacoluthon and the figure of the Woman, ‘the absolute Other’.6 In fact, it is precisely 
as this absolute other that Woman appears for the second time in ‘“Le Parjure,” 
Perhaps’, in the character of Judith, Stéphane’s wife in Le Parjure. Judith stands in 
opposition to ‘all these acolytes who do not accompany…Paul de Man, Henri Thomas, 
Stéphane Chalier, Father Chalier, the narrator Hillis Miller’ (WA, 199) and Derrida 
himself. Her presence exposes ‘a kind of idiocy of man, of the two men who have 
understood nothing, the two acolytes, the perjurer and his witness’ (WA, 198). Whilst 
they are ‘sleeping in the same body in some way’, she ‘keeps watch, is stirring about, 
making decisions, and so on’ (WA, 198). It is only she who has the power to arrest 
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these endless narrative chains of storytelling and lying, to perform the decisive action 
that terminates that chain, and, in fact, ends not just the novel, but also Derrida’s 
discussion of it – the figure of the Woman ends ‘“Le Parjure,” Perhaps’ just as she ends 
other Derrida texts such as Otobiographies and Pas d’hospitalité.7 
In her decisiveness and her ability to act, Judith exposes the idiocy of these 
speaking and writing men. But, at the same time, ‘one feels an accusation on the 
horizon: a couple of men united as one, “a single idiot,” brothers, in sum, seems to 
denounce the woman’ (WA, 198). Both Albertine and Judith occupy ambivalent 
positions in this male narration. They are figures of power – of dissimulation and of 
action respectively – and yet they are also powerless, excluded from the brotherhood of 
the male by which they are represented. Albertine may provide the anacoluthic model 
for precisely the relationship that binds these men, but she remains definitively external 
to it – ‘the example of the eternal feminine, evasive and unpossesable’ (WA, 169). 
Whereas Albertine originates that textual and verbal relationality, Judith has the power 
to end it, to abort the word, to ‘keep’ this last word. This seems both a relief – she is the 
word’s ‘guardian’ – but also a dangerous termination. The transmission of the word 
falters, and, indeed, ends, in the possession of ‘an impassive and at bottom inaccessible 
woman’ (WA, 198) who is, again, wholly external to the male line that has up until now 
secured its transmission. In ‘“Le Parjure,” Perhaps’, the Woman is at once both envied 
and despised, necessary and evil, essential and excluded.  
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 This woman, now, here, rereading ‘“Le Parjure,” Perhaps’, recalls that woman, 
then, there, in Loughborough, listening to Derrida speak it. She recalls taking umbrage 
at such a remarkably traditional figuration and reduction of the female. She recalls 
Nicholas Royle questioning Derrida on this issue, and Derrida’s response that ‘in many 
dialogical texts – or texts in which there are not simply two but more than one voice – I 
try to embody this absolute Other in the feminine voice’.8 ‘But I’m still the Other,’ she 
cries. She recalls Derrida’s disavowal of this othering – ‘I was just commenting on the 
grammar of the text, it is it is in the text; it was not my thesis, I was just reading it’.9 She 
recalls Derrida’s epigraph to ‘“Le Parjure,” Perhaps’: 
 
By “the ethics of reading,” the reader will remember, I mean the aspect of the 
act of reading in which there is a response to the text that is both necessitated, 
in the sense that it is a response to an irresistible demand, and free, in the 
sense that I must take responsibility for my response and for further effects, 
“interpersonal,” institutional, social, political, or historical, of my act of 
reading, for example as that act takes the form of teaching or of published 
commentary on a given text. What happens when I read must happen, but I 
must acknowledge it as my act of reading, though just what the “I” is or 
becomes in this transaction is another question.10 
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In this essay, here, now, this woman seeks to usurp her othered status and join in the 
femininely engendered but masculinly enacted anacoluthic lineage of following and not 
following. Mine is a movement which is ambitious and indignant – to include a female 
voice in that line, and to insist on the necessity and rightness of that inclusion – and 
anxious – in entering into that line does one relinquish the power of these alternate 
‘feminine’ spaces of thought and relationality? What alternate mode(l) of relationality, 
for instance, might be offered by the lesbian liaisons Albertine’s anacolutha both reveal 
and conceal? In the rest of this essay I risk, perhaps, betraying Derrida with an excess of 
fidelity by arresting here these reflections on the Woman. Instead, I wish to take the 
anacoluthon from Derrida, as he does from Hillis Miller, as he does from De Man, as he 
does from Proust, as he does from the great grammarians of the past. In my turn, I want 
to put this figure to work again - to invent it further - by exploring the way in which the 
anacoluthon lies at the heart of the process of reading and writing - indeed, of thinking - 
which is repeatedly performed by Hillis Miller, by Derrida and, in this instance, by 
myself.  
 
 
 Interruption 
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 In ‘“Le Parjure,” Perhaps’, Derrida cites Pierre Fontanier’s definition of the 
anacoluthon in Les Figures du discourse (1968): 
 
“It consists in implying, and always in conformity with usage or without 
contravening it, the companion of an expressed word; it consists, I say, in 
letting stand alone a word that calls out for another as companion. This 
missing companion is no longer a companion; it is what in Greek is called 
Anacoluthon, and this name is also that of the figure.” (WA, 182) 
 
Fontanier’s definition emphasises, above all else, the interruptive element of the 
anacoluthon, the element which provokes feelings of disappointment, even loss, at the 
lack of the expected completion of the inaugural construction or thought. Interrupting 
the continuity of writing or speech, the anacoluthon leaves the reader or listener, albeit 
momentarily, with a sense of confusion and frustrated expectation - ‘the similarity 
between anacoluthon and parabasis stems from the fact that both figures interrupt the 
expectations of a given grammatical or rhetorical movement.’11 The anacoluthon causes 
a perturbation (this is Hillis Miller’s word) - laced, as Fontanier’s definition emphasises, 
with sadness - which might best describe my feelings in response to Derrida’s death; 
perturbation, and, unfairly, a sense of betrayal, of infidelity, of a breach of promise (and 
here we are reminded of Albertine’s anacolutha): 
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Anakolouthia designates a rupture in the consequence, an interruption in the 
sequence itself, within a grammatical syntax or in an order in general, in an 
agreement, thus also in a set, whatever it may be, in a community, let’s say, 
or a partnership, an alliance, a friendship, a being-together: a company or a 
guild [compagnonnage]. (WA, 181) 
 
However, Fontanier’s definition over-emphasises the absence or lack caused by the 
anacoluthon at the expense of recognising that the anacoluthon is not simply an 
interruption of speech or writing. Rather - as the OED definition of ‘anacoluthia’ 
reminds us - it is the passing from one construction to another before the former is 
completed. The anacoluthon contains an interruption of sequence, but it also provides an 
alternative ending; the construction is completed, albeit agrammatically. As Sarah 
Wood so acutely remarks in ‘“Try thinking as if perhaps…”’ (2003) – an essay also 
‘spun out of’ the Loughborough conference, at which she was the female discussant on 
Derrida’s paper – Fontanier’s definition of the anacoluthon differs from that to be found 
in dictionaries and rhetorical handbooks, for in such guides the anacoluthon is  
 
‘a non-sequential syntactical construction in which the latter part of a 
sentence does not fit the earlier’. According to this definition both parts of an 
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anacoluthic sentence are present. The sentence is a metaphorical unity 
divided by a syntactical disparity. However in Fontanier’s rhetorical 
definition, there is a break in presence: one part of anacoluthon is necessarily 
missing and his description of the figure is laden with impersonal pathos.12 
 
In its dictionary definition, anacoluthia is not synonymous with aposiopesis, ‘a sudden 
breaking off in the midst of a sentence’. Wood observes that whereas the aposiopoetic 
sentence depends upon the absence of its second half, the anacoluthon causes us to 
reflect on the very impossibility of the aposiopoetic:  
 
Can there be a definitive breaking off or leaving out, without the possibility 
of some anacoluthic attachment, even if that attachment only operates 
relationally in terms of negation, for example producing something like [an] 
‘annihilated feeling’…?13 
 
In the following section, by continuing to speak after Derrida’s death, I enact the 
anacoluthic attachment of his breaking off. I suggest how the agrammatical continuance 
of the linguistic definition of “true” anacolutha might provide an interestingly formal 
model for the event of reading and writing - of thinking - as Derrida understands and 
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practises it. Still, in closing, I cannot but return to the ‘annihilated feeling’ that remains, 
despite the unavoidability of continuance, in the wake of Derrida’s death. 14  
 
 
Not Following: That we might go on thinking 
 
In ‘A Note on the Definition and Description of True Anacolutha’ (1988), Nils 
Erik Enkvist remarks that ‘the term anacoluthon (from Greek an- ‘not’ + akolouthos 
‘following’, hence ‘lacking proper sequence’) has been used by linguists in senses 
ranging from the very broad to the very specific’.15 In the broadest sense, ‘anacoluthon’ 
names ‘any structure deviating from some standard of well-formedness’ (TA, 316), but 
in this essay Enkvist is concerned to use the term in a more specific sense. He thus 
defines a ‘true anacoluthon’ (and we will return to the oddness of this expression in a 
moment) as ‘a blend of two overlapping structures’ (TA, 316): ‘a true anacoluthon 
consists of two parts, each of which is syntactically correct in itself, as far as it goes 
(though it can be subject to hesitation, correction, and melioration)’ (TA, 316-7). As 
Enkvist continues his explanation, it becomes clear that a “true” anacoluthon does not in 
fact consists of two parts, but of three – an ‘initial structure’, a ‘final structure’, and a 
‘centre’ that functions as ‘the overlap string shared by both constructions, the initial and 
the final’ (TA, 317). In Enkvist’s example, ‘I have been (for the last year) I have been 
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doing that thing’, the centre of the anacoluthon is placed in parentheses: ‘the initial 
string [or ‘initial periphery’] is correct up to the second parenthesis ); the final structure 
[or ‘final periphery’] is correct after the first parenthesis ( ’ (TA, 317). Enkvist 
illustrates the overlapping structure of “true” anacolutha in the tree diagram reproduced 
below: 
 
[open access rights to image not obtained] 
 
For further clarification, Enkvist explains that the definition of “true” anacolutha can 
also be given ‘as a process grammar with three rules’: 
 
(i) produce an initial structure consisting of a well-formed complete or 
incomplete string X + Y, 
(ii) syntactically disregard X (which may nevertheless go on contributing 
to the total semantic and pragmatic information of the discourse, 
particularly if it is not repeated or paraphrased), and 
(iii) produce an element or string Z which makes Y + Z a well-formed 
string. (TA, 317) 
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Most interesting in Enkvist’s definition of “true” anacolutha is the way in which the 
centre of the anacoluthon functions as a bridge, as a way of moving from one string, 
structure, idea or thought, to another that is different from, but (a)grammatically 
connected to, the first. In this movement, the initial structure is disregarded, but, 
significantly, ‘it may nevertheless go on contributing to the total semantic and 
pragmatic information of the discourse, particularly if it is not repeated or paraphrased’. 
We might understand the process of thought, of reading or writing on any text, in a 
similar way. An author produces a initial text consisting of a complete or incomplete 
string X + Y. In creating her own text, a reader/writer engages with the initial text, but 
syntactically disregards X – X remains the part of any initial text which goes on to 
contribute to the meaning of the final text produced by the reader/writer, but which is 
not repeated or paraphrased in it. X represents that part of any text we read that 
influences our thought but which we do not explicitly go on to use. In this instance of 
my discussion of Derrida’s ‘“La Parjure,” Perhaps’, that might include, amongst other 
things, Derrida’s discussion of Thomas’s novel, of the relationship between the 
anacoluthon, storytelling and lying, of the significance of the perhaps, of the 
relationship between death and the father. All these elements are the X of Derrida’s text 
that I have been influenced by, that have influenced this essay I am writing now, both 
consciously and unconsciously, but upon which I have not commented explicitly. In 
contrast, Y represents that part of a text that the reader/writer appropriates, keeps, takes 
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for herself, and combines with new elements, Z, in order to create a new text, Y + Z. Y 
is that part of a text which catches your attention, which stays in your mind, that detail 
that prompts ‘the ecstasy of revelation’ (WM, 38), that enables ‘the freshness of a 
reading’ (WM, 38), that allows you to say something more, something new, something 
different, and yet something that it would have been impossible to say, that would have 
been unthinkable, without that initial text. In this instance, Y is the very idea of the 
anacoluthon which so caught my attention when I first heard Derrida read ‘“La Parjure,” 
Perhaps’ at Loughborough in 2001.  
The structure of “true” anacolutha thus illustrates the way reading and writing, 
thinking, happens – the way in which any text is produced out of a prior text, to which it 
can be faithful only by being simultaneously faithful and unfaithful. This is the 
agrammaticality of following represented in and by the anacoluthon: 
 
Two infidelities, an impossible choice: on the one hand, not to say anything 
that comes back to oneself, to one’s own voice, to remain silent, or at the very 
least to let oneself be accompanied or preceded in counterpoint by the 
friend’s voice. Thus, out of zealous devotion or gratitude, out of approbation 
as well, to be content with just quoting, with just accompanying that which 
more or less directly comes back or returns to the other, to let him speak, to 
efface oneself in front of and to follow his speech, and to do so right in front 
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of him. But this excess of fidelity would end up saying and exchanging 
nothing. It returns to death. It points to death, sending death back to death. On 
the other hand, by avoiding all quotation, all identification, all rapprochement 
even, so that what is addressed to or spoken of [the dead] truly comes from 
the other, from the living friend, one risks making him disappear again, as if 
one could add more death to death and thus indecently pluralize it. We are 
left then with having to do and not do both at once, with having to correct one 
infidelity by the other. (WM, 45) 
 
The centre of the anacoluthon is, indeed, as Derrida has described it, both a rupture and 
an interruption, but, we now see, it is also a bridge, or, perhaps, a fold, that enables the 
continuation of thinking and discourse: ‘the essential requirement is that the centre must 
be capable of occurring as an overlap between the initial and the final structures’ (TA, 
321). This overlap - and the creation of a final text that is agrammatically related to the 
initial text (that follows and does not follow it) - is the very condition of fidelity. There 
are, of course, varying degrees of this fidelity. As Enkvist explains, texts X and Z may 
be ‘closely related in form and referent’ (TA, 322), but in other instances ‘the choice of 
semantic content for the final periphery can be relatively independent of the initial 
periphery’ (TA, 322). Key to this fidelity, no matter how close the relationship between 
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X and Z, is that Z says at least something new. In reading and writing, in thinking, one 
has to invent, that is, both disclose and create, if only to respect the alterity of the other: 
 
this word “invention”…hesitates perhaps between creative invention, the 
production of what is not – or was not earlier – and revelatory invention, 
the discovery and unveiling of what already is or finds itself to be there 
Such an invention thus hesitates perhaps, it is suspended undecidably 
between fiction and truth, but also between lying and veracity, that is, 
between perjury and fidelity. (WA, 168) 
 
The anacoluthic structure of breach, fold and agrammatical continuance aids thought by 
providing the means for this inventiveness. The strangeness of Enkvist’s attempt to fix 
“true” anacolutha arises from the term’s openness to, and embodiment of, this 
suspended invention, according to which it operates ‘to dissociate, disjoin, interrupt, at 
the heart of the word [including its own]…at the very inside of language and discourse, 
as does a trope in general’ (WA, 194). Hence, ‘the essential role played by the discreet 
but decisive intervention of the undecidable that is the “perhaps”’ (WA, 168) which 
Derrida employs above, and which is integral to Hillis Miller’s definition of the 
anacoluthon, and to any definition in general.16 
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Anacolutha formally allow for the unexpected and the inventive in thinking. Their 
‘abrupt breaches of syntax’ engender changes of direction in thought that would not 
have been possible without the structural and semantic shifts the anacoluthon allows:  
 
They are one way in which a speaker can change his mind and shift 
structures, perhaps more often subconsciously or unconsciously than 
consciously. An anacoluthon is the smoothest of all types of structural shift. It 
does not overtly signal the break in syntactic patterning but bridges the 
discrepancy by means of the centre shared by the initial and the final 
structures. In this sense anacolutha hide, or embellish, the break in syntactic 
continuity between the initial and final structures. (TA, 323) 
 
More than this, the anacoluthic moment of interruption, of forgetting, is in fact integral 
to thinking: ‘If there is no thinking without the risk of forgetting oneself, if forgetting to 
think, if forgetting to think of it is a fault, if such an interruption, such an intermittence 
is a failure, then what is called thinking?’ (WA, 163). The forgetting of the X (in 
Enkvist’s terminology), the interruption at the heart of the anacoluthon, marks ‘the 
amnesia essential to the movement of truth for finite and mortal beings’ (WA, 194). As 
Derrida remarks, this finitude is ‘at the origin of the anacoluthic interruption, of 
discontinuity and divisibility in general, of the disjunction that makes relation at once 
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possible and impossible’ (WA, 194). Anacolutha give rise to ‘instantaneous 
substitutions’ thanks to ‘ruptures in construction’ (WA, 183). They evidence ‘an 
irreducible distraction at the heart of finite thought, a discontinuity, an interruptability 
that is at bottom the very resource, the ambiguous power of the anacoluthon’ (WA, 
191). By their very discontinuity, their very agrammaticality, anacolutha enable one to 
carry on thinking even as this continuance must faithfully betray the text one is writing 
on or the person one is following. 
 
 
Betrayal: ‘strange pain, strange sin’ 
 
The agrammatical continuance of the anacoluthon opens the way for new 
thought and new speech – an after-life, one might say. But is the above account not 
perhaps a little too hopeful, a little too cheerful? Despite that continuance, one cannot 
help still feel the interruption of the initial structure, text, speech, work, oeuvre, thought; 
the very real death, in this instance, of a man. Such is perhaps the reason for the 
dissatisfaction, the sadness, of any reading or writing, of any thinking – that sense that 
one has never completely got to grips with the text one is reading, that something 
beyond our grasp, incomplete and never to be completed, remains. Such is also perhaps 
the reason for my feeling, even now, as I finish writing this essay that breaks my silence 
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since Derrida’s death (this is the first text I have written since he went), that I am 
missing him – in the sense, perhaps, that all thinking misses what it aims at, ‘not as one 
misses a target – once and for all – more in the way that one misses a person’.17 I still 
feel that to continue to speak now that he is gone is to betray him; that no continuance at 
all, even the (in)fidelity of an agrammatical following, might have been more 
appropriate, more respectful, more proper, so close upon Derrida’s death; that, in the 
end, our current loss is so profound, and remains so fresh, that 
‘…it may be 
That only silence suiteth best.’18 
‘But then what, silence? Is this not another wound, another insult?’ (WM, 
49) 
‘I don’t know, perhaps it’s a dream, all a dream, that would surprise me, I’ll 
wake, in the silence, and never sleep again, it will be I, or dream, dream again, 
dream of a silence, a dream silence, full of murmurs, I don’t know, that’s all 
words, never wake, all words, there’s nothing else, you must go on, that’s all I 
know, they’re going to stop, I know that well, I can feel it, they’re going to 
abandon me, it will be the silence, for a moment, a good few moments, or it 
will be mine, the lasting one, that didn’t last, that still lasts, it will be I, you 
must go on, I can’t go on, you must go on, I’ll go on, you must say words, as 
long as there are any, until they find me, until they say me, strange pain, 
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strange sin, you must go on, perhaps it’s done already, perhaps they have said 
me already, perhaps they have carried me to the threshold of my story, before 
the door that opens on my story, that would surprise me, if it opens, it will be 
I, it will be the silence, where I am, I don’t know, I’ll never know, in the 
silence you don’t know, you must go on, I can’t go on, I’ll go on.’19 
‘As long as the one who is close to us exists, and, with him, the thought in 
which he affirms himself, his thought opens itself to us, but preserved in this 
very relation, and what preserves it is not only the mobility of life (this would 
be very little), but the unpredictability introduced into this thought by the 
strangeness of the end…’20 
 
 
Sarah Dillon 
December 2004 
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